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Abstract  
Does the RBV represent a case of scientific progress? And has it emerged as the dominant 
approach to the analysis of competitive advantage for this reason? Conventional criteria 
for scientific progress, notably those of the growth of knowledge literature, are not 
particularly helpful for understanding this. Instead, it is argued that in order to understand 
why the RBV is an instance of scientific progress, we should begin from the notion that 
reduction is at the heart of progress in science, and that many scientists implicitly or 
explicitly hold this view. The RBV is a case of scientific progress because it identified 
theoretical mechanisms at levels lower than those that were usually investigated in 
strategy research prior to the RBV. Unfortunately, the micro-emphasis of the RBV gave 
way during the 1990s to more aggregative modes of theorizing (i.e., the capabilities 
approach). Thus, the RBV represents an “unfinished revolution” as there is still 
considerable potential to dig deeper in the deep structure of competitive advantage.  
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“Reduction is at the heart of progress in science.”  
– Elster (1989: 74)     
 
Introduction 
The RBV is now rather generally acknowledged as having the status of dominant perspective in the 
strategy field. In retrospect it may well have held this position for more than a decade.1 An 
impression of the dominance of the RBV may quickly be gained from inspecting the major journals 
in the strategy field. Thus, literally no issue of the Strategic Management Journal is published 
without at least one paper applying the analytical framework of the RBV, typically either in the 
Barney (1991) formulation or the somewhat different Peteraf (1993) formulation. A number of 
special journal issues, including the present one, and book volumes have been dedicated to assessing 
the past, present status and possible future of the perspective (Journal of Management 2001; 
Strategic Management Journal 2003; Management Revue 2004). Thus, it is hardly a controversial 
claim that the RBV is a, and very likely the, dominant approach to strategic management. This paper 
raises the issue of whether the RBV is also a case of scientific progress and which criteria we may 
employ to decide this issue.  The main argument is as follows.  
If we imagine ourselves placed as detached and neutral observers 15-20 years ago, surveying the 
landscape of strategic approaches, it would not be so obvious that the RBV would eventually achieve 
its now dominant status, at least if standard criteria for scientific progress were applied. Thus, the 
RBV failed on basic Popperian criteria (Popper 1934), in the sense that the perspective was for a long 
time, and with some justification, criticized for not being falsifiable (e.g., Priem and Butler 2001; 
Barney 2001). It failed on Lakatosian criteria (Lakatos 1970): Granted, the RBV explained 
competitive advantage in a novel manner2; however, competitive advantage in itself was no 
Lakatosian “novel fact” in the sense of a hitherto un-recognized and un-theorized feature of the 
World (Lakatos 1970), as differential performance has always been the main dependent variable in 
the strategy field. And it failed on Kuhnian criteria (Kuhn 1970), as it did not lead to the complete 
overthrow of previous strategic management perspectives. The RBV, then, did not really represent a 
clear cut case of scientific progress ⎯ at least if evaluated in terms of the mainstream theory of 
science literature.  
                                                 
1 In particular, the Barney (1991) paper with its handy and easy-to-comprehend VRI (with the “O” added later) 
formulation of the conditions of sustained competitive advantage appears to have been particularly important 
for spreading the RBV gospel (Priem and Butler 2001). This paper has been cited 1501 times (Social Science 
Citation Index, accessed on 18 October 2005) making it one of the most cited papers in management over the 
last two decades. 
2 At least in the context of the strategy field.  The indebtedness of the RBV to the Chicago-UCLA approach to 
price theory has often been noted, for example, by Foss (2003). 
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The emergence and eventual dominance of the RBV is a rather complex process, interwoven with  a 
number features that are perhaps best understood in a sociology of science framework.3 However, 
this does not mean that the emergence of the RBV is entirely a matter of sociological “context”.  On 
the contrary, I here want make the case that the success of the RBV is well-deserved, for the reason 
that it in important respects dug deeper into the “deep structure” of competitive advantage than 
previous approaches. Moreover, part of the reason why the RBV became influential is that this was 
recognized and rewarded in terms of increasing adherence to basic RBV tenets by the strategic 
management community. Thus, it is possible to tell a “rational” story (rather than one stressing 
politics, emotions, prestige, etc) about the success of the RBV in terms of influence in this 
community.  
Of course, this story presupposes, first, that reductionism can be a way that science progresses and, 
second, that this is recognized in the scientific community. As this view is far from uncontroversial I 
briefly explain and defend it, linking it to the classic debate in social science between methodological 
individualists and methodological collectivists (On Scientific Progress and Reductionism). After 
looking at (parts of) the history of the strategy discipline in terms that make use of this progress 
criterion (The Evolution of Strategic Management: Levels of Analysis, Micro-foundations and 
Collectivism), I end by arguing that the reductionist theme is primarily represented by the RBV, but 
that the RBV still needs to dig even deeper than the resource-level (Concluding Discussion: The RBV 
as an Unfinished Revolution in Strategic Management).  In sum, this paper contributes to a small but 
growing literature on theory of science aspects of strategic management (Godfrey and Hill 1995; Mir 
and Watson 2001; Powell 2001, 2003; Farjoun 2002; Arend 2003), but with a specific application 
(the RBV) and a distinct, novel perspective (scientific progress as the uncovering of mechanisms at 
deeper analytical levels).   
 
On Scientific Progress and Reductionism: The Case of Strategic Management 
Theory of Science Debates in Economics and Strategic Management 
The theory of science has historically had a number of aims, although the priorities have changed 
quite dramatically, perhaps particularly over the last twenty years. A traditional aim has been to 
characterize science as a distinct field of inquiry, to describe the procedures that secure scientists 
privileged access to Nature’s Secrets, and to identify the criteria ⎯ such as potential falsifiability 
                                                 
3  Such as the fact that Barney and Rumelt were both interacting with economists Harold Demsetz and Armen 
Alchian in the context of the UCLA.  The importance of these two economists for the evolution of the RBV 
cannot be over-estimated.  I have discussed this in Foss (2000). 
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(Popper 1934) ⎯ that may distinguish scientific from non-scientific arguments (i.e., the 
“demarcation problem”).  
Another traditional activity has been the search for criteria of scientific progress, an undertaking 
almost wholly dominated by the so-called “growth of knowledge” literature (Popper 1934; Kuhn 
1970; Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977). In the social sciences, the growth of knowledge literature became 
particularly influential in economics, arguably the discipline that overall has influenced strategic 
management the most. Specifically, a watered down version of Popperian falsificationism in the 
guise of Milton Friedman’s (1953) brand of instrumentalism became hugely influential in economics, 
and the growth of knowledge literature became relatively influential in economics in the 1970s and 
1980s. Thus, a cottage industry ⎯ now very much a sunset industry ⎯ that explored various changes 
in economic theory in analytical terms from the growth of knowledge literature developed in the 
1980s (see Backhouse 1994 for a post mortem). In the context of the strategy discipline, growth of 
knowledge arguments were forcefully put forward by Camerer (1985) and Balakrishnan, 
Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1989), that is, strategy scholars strongly influenced by economics. In 
particular, these scholars criticized the lack of falsifiable analytical content in strategy content 
research. Growth of knowledge arguments continue to be invoked in methodological discussions in 
strategic management (e.g., Powell 2001: 876).  
In economic methodology, Imre Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programme was 
particularly influential. The important organizing category in Lakatos’ model is “the scientific 
research program”, which is clearly a more detailed version of Kuhn’s concept of paradigm.  
Specifically, it should be thought of as a series of theories that comprise a continuous whole because 
they share some so-called “hard core propositions” and are constructed according to heuristics that 
are specific to the scientific research program. The research program changes by modifying 
propositions in the “protective belt” (the “positive heuristic” informs the researcher about how this 
should legitimately be done, and the negative heuristic informs him about what cannot legitimately 
be done), while keeping intact the hard core. This is so far a descriptive model of scientific activity. 
But Lakatos adds a normative dimension by introducing notions of progression and degeneration:  
Let us take a series of theories, T1, T2, T3, .... where each subsequent theory results 
from adding auxiliary clauses to ... the previous theory in order to accommodate some 
anomaly, each theory having at least as much content as the unrefuted content of its 
predecessor. Let us say that such a series of theories is theoretically progressive (or 
‘constitutes a theoretically progressive problemshift’) if each new theory has some 
excess empirical content over its predecessor ... Let us say that a theoretically 
progressive series of theories is also empirically progressive (or ‘constitutes an 
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empirically progressive problemshift’) if some of this excess empirical content is also 
corroborated ... Finally, let us call a problemshift progressive if it is both theoretically 
and empirically progressive, and degenerating if it is not (Lakatos 1970, p.118). 
By “excess empirical content” is here meant that the relevant theory puts forward some “novel fact”, 
some hitherto unnoticed prediction, which apparently (Lakatos is not entirely forthcoming here) 
should be understood as predicting novel phenomenon.4   
Economic methodologists gradually realized that economists were not terribly scrupulous with 
respect to practising the falsificationism they hailed in their rhetorical practice (Blaug 1980), and it 
was similarly found that it was quite hard to come up with convincing examples of Kuhnian 
revolutions or Lakatosian novel facts in economics (DeMarchi and Blaug 1991; Backhouse 1994; 
Foss 1998). As a consequence, the focus began to shift to examining the actual practice of 
economists, that is, to those criteria that may be inferred through the actual choices that are being 
made in theory-building, and away from abstract and context-independent criteria for theory choice 
(e.g., Mäki 1992). The wish to pass judgment on actual theory choice was also downplayed. Partly in 
parallel with this, the economics profession had a brief flirtation with rhetorical analysis, that is, the 
actual acts of persuasion that practising economists employ to convince their peers of the soundness 
of their arguments (McCloskey 1983). And some of the reorientation away from the growth of 
knowledge literature took place in tandem with and to some extent inspired by currents in the 
sociology of science, notably the various (“strong”, “weak”) “programs” in the sociology of science 
(e.g., Bloor 1976). However, unlike the situation in many other social sciences, very few economists 
and economic methodologists have bought into the more extreme positions associated with the strong 
program in the sociology of science.   
Strategic management is in a number of ways reminiscent of economics, not only because economics 
is an important foundational input in strategic management research, or because many strategic 
management scholars have an economics background, but also because strategic management seems 
to have gone through rather similar waves of methodological discussion and opinion. Early 
enthusiasm, mentioned above, with growth of knowledge philosophers, notably Popper, (e.g., 
Camerer 1985; Balakrishnan et al. 1989) gave way to more “pluralistic” positions (e.g., Bowman 
1990). For example, the “rhetorical” approach of economic historian Donald MacCloskey was 
forcefully applied by Joe Mahoney in a string of papers in the beginning of the 1990s (e.g., Mahoney 
and Pandian 1992; Mahoney 1993).   
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, “... the notion of ‘empirical content’, of  ‘novel fact’, of ‘corroboration’ are among the most 
vexing in the philosophy of science” (Rosenberg 1986, p. 135), and Hands (1991b, p.94) outright proclaims 
that “I have spent a great amount of time with the Lakatosian literature and I have no idea what Lakatos ‘really 
meant’  by novel facts”.   
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It is not difficult to see why strategic management scholars would be uncomfortable with growth of 
knowledge arguments. First, although strategic management is a very strongly empirical field, it is 
also clear that most strategic management researchers do not follow falsificationism in the form 
espoused by Popper, but rather the “ … statistical view of testing that accepts that neither refutation 
nor confirmation can ever be final, and that all we can hope to do is to discover on the basis of finite 
amounts of imperfect knowledge what is the balance of probabilities among existing hypotheses” 
(Lipsey 1966: 184). Second, the Kuhnian and Lakatosian schema seem difficult to apply to a field 
that does not go back more than at most fifty years. It is not clear that there are in any meaningful 
sense Kuhnian paradigms or Lakatosian scientific research programmes in strategic management. 
Moreover, it is unclear what are the Lakatosian “novel facts” in strategic management research 
(perhaps depending on how exactly that enigmatic concept is defined). To be sure, “competitive 
advantage,” whether sustained or not, hardly qualifies as a novel fact, as the recognition that some 
firms are more successful than others on a sustained basis certainly qualifies any strategic 
management approach, and indeed the field itself.  
Still, strategic management scholars continue to vigorously debate methodological issues and the 
subject seems to have increased in popularity recently. Thus, Godfrey and Hill (1995) applied the 
philosophy debate on how to deal with the problem of unobservables to strategic management; 
Powell (2001) explored philosophical aspects of the link between competitive advantage and 
financial performance that is foundational to the strategic management field; Mir and Watson (2000) 
argued in favour of a constructivist approach to understanding the evolution of the strategic 
management field, and Kwan and Tsang (2001) countered with making the same point on behalf of 
critical realism. However, what methodologically inclined strategic management scholars seem to 
have given up discussing the issue of what constitutes scientific progress in the field. In contrast, I 
here propose to revitalize that discussion in terms of proposing that one important way (certainly not 
the only one) in which strategic management progresses as a scientific field is by means of 
performing analytical reduction, that is, showing how phenomena on a given level of analysis is 
really constituted by the action and interaction of entities, ultimately human beings, at levels lower 
down.  
Reduction as Progress 
I want to here propose that many practising social scientists, particularly economists (cf. also Mäki 
2001), but also many strategic management scholars are “moderate reductionists,” and that they tend 
to associate scientific progress with the application of a reductionist research strategy.5 By 
                                                 
5 It is very likely that disciplinary background plays an important role here, strategic management scholars with 
more of an economics background arguably being more disposed towards reductionism for disciplinary reasons 
than strategic management scholars with more of a sociology background. 
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reductionism is here understood the explanatory position that the best understanding of a complex, 
and in social science: collective-level, phenomenon “… should be sought at the level of structure, 
behaviour and laws of its component parts plus their relations” (Silberstein 2002: 81). It entails a 
search for “deep structure” underneath aggregate phenomena (Williamson 1996).  
On the criterion of reduction as progress, a body of knowledge (whether a theory, research program, 
paradigm, research tradition, etc. etc.) makes progress when a novel analytical reduction is 
performed, that is, when one or more explanatory mechanisms, constructs, etc. that were hitherto 
blackboxed are opened up and addressed in terms that are congenial to the other elements of the body 
of knowledge (i.e., a purely psychological explanation of preferences is not scientific progress within 
economics; although it does open up the black box of preferences, this is not done in economic 
terms). Such an improved understanding is synonymous with scientific progress, because it allows us 
to better grasp the real generative mechanisms that produce events (Bhaskar 1978).6    
Reductionism has generated much heated controversy, including controversy in strategic 
management. For example, Bourgeois (1984: 586) argued that “… reductionism eliminates much of 
the richness that characterizes the strategic management process.” As the position here is the exact 
opposite ⎯ we need more reductionism in strategic management research to increase the richness of 
the field ⎯, it is advisable to be explicit about what reductionism does and does not entail.  
Thus, the qualifier “moderate” in “moderate reductionism” here indicates that the aim is not to pursue 
the kind of charicature reductionism well known from debates in natural science:  
An extreme and classical kind of reductionism holds that all laws governing the behaviour 
of complex objects should be deducible from the laws of lower-level science and thus, 
ultimately, the laws of all sciences should be deducible from those of particle physics” 
(Dupré 2001: 309).  
Applied to strategic management such a view would imply that competitive advantage be reduced to 
the genetic endowment of firm founders (and, indeed, ultimately to the laws of particle physics). 
Furthermore, reductionism in social science is sometimes taken to mean that all explanation must 
make reference to the full set of concrete actions, preferences, beliefs, etc. of concrete agents when 
trying to explain a phenomenon on the social domain. Obviously, this is very often not feasible 
because of the sheer number of interacting agents and the complexity of their interaction ⎯ a 
                                                 
6 Although Elster’s (1989: 74) dictum that “[r]eduction is at the heart of progress in science,” would likely be 
accepted by many scientists and philosophers, I am not aware of any sustained theory of science discussions of 
reduction(ism) as (a) progress (strategy). 
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problem that is occasionally referred to as “Cournot’s Problem” (e.g., Davis 2003). Whatever that 
may be,7 no such extreme reductionism is advocated here. 
Rather, “moderate reductionism” entails a sustained attempt to identify and theorize the causal social 
mechanisms ⎯ the “cogs and wheels” (Elster 1989: 3) ⎯ that generate and explain observed 
associations between events. This view is consistent with scientific and methodological realism 
(Harré 1970; Bhaskar 1978; Foss 1994). It is, however, different from the traditional covering-law 
model of explanation of Carl Hempel and others, because the covering-law model does not imply an 
insistence on identifying genuine causality.   
The reductionism advocated here seeks to eschew explanatory black boxes in principle. However, 
sometimes a case can be made for some degree of black box explanation. One reason is disciplinary: 
For example, most economists want to treat tastes as black boxes, because not doing so would take 
them into entirely unfamiliar psychological territory. Strategic management scholars may agree on 
this point. Another reason for allowing some black boxes to enter explanation is explanatory 
parsimony, ultimately implied by bounded rationality (Hedström and Swedberg 1998:12). As Lewis 
(1986: 214) explains,”[a]ny particular event that we might wish to explain stands at the end of a long 
and complicated causal history. We might imagine a world where causal histories are short and 
simple; but in the world as we know it, the only question is whether they are infinite or merely 
enormous.”  This problem is clearly akin to “Cournot’s problem.”  
Luckily, it is simply not always necessary to seek and perform “rock-bottom explanation” or to refer 
to all individual level facts for an explanation to be valid. For example, the strategic management 
scholar who is cognizant of economics knows that under competitive conditions, decision-makers in 
firms only have a very limited feasible behavioural repertoire. If they do not choose an element of 
this set, they will not survive. Thus, although there is no break with the ontological position that only 
individuals can choose, our strategic management scholar pragmatically recognizes that a structure 
(i.e., competitive conditions) can substitute in an explanatory sense for a much more complicated 
explanation involving individual action and interaction (for a related approach, see Koppl and 
Langlois 1991; Satz and Ferejohn 1994). However, being a proper reductionist, he knows that such a 
“structural” story is at best a reduced form explanation, or, if you like, shorthand. 
Economists and strategic management scholars perform somewhat related explanatory operations 
when they construct firm-level arguments. Thus, to involve the argument in an explanation that a 
firm has a strategy or acts in a certain way is essentially shorthand for a complex set of underlying 
                                                 
7 As an objection to reductionism, the argument seems to be a red herring, as Cournot’s problem does not rule 
out the possibility of explaining in terms of tractable models. The problem may be one of empirical application 
of a reductionist research strategy, but it is not one of theory and model-building. 
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individual actions and interactions. However, the descriptive accuracy of this shorthand is will 
depend on, for example, the transaction costs that characterize the international organization of the 
firm: If internal transaction costs are low (so that communication between organizational members 
can take place and side-payments are possible), it makes sense to speak of organizational members 
acting as a unified body, because goals and incentives can be aligned with an overall strategy 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992).   
Individualism and Collectivism 
In a social science context, ”reductionism” is unavoidably associated with ”methodological 
individualism.” Notably, for more than a hundred years, economics (e.g., Menger 1883; Hayek 1952; 
Arrow 1951; Dosi 1995), sociology (e.g., Durkheim 1962; Lazarsfeld and Menzel 1970; Coleman 
1990) and the philosophy of science (Popper 1957; Satz and Ferejohn 1994; Kincaid 1997) has 
witnessed a debate about whether individuals (“micro”) or social collectives (“macro”) have 
explanatory primacy (Dosi 1995; Felin and Foss 2005).8 Reductionists have taken the former 
position.9
 In its most extreme form, methodological individualism asserts that in explanations of social 
phenomena reference is allowed only to individuals, their properties and their (inter)actions. Thus, at 
no point in the explanation can reference be made to supra-individual entities as in any way acting as 
causal agents. No “shortcuts” by making reference to aggregates are allowed anywhere in the 
explanation. On this program, explaining, for example, “the strategy of a firm” must always involve 
making reference to the mental states of all relevant organizational stakeholders.10 Many 
methodological individualists do not espouse this strong form, which will very often run into 
Cournot’s problem. For example, Agassi (1960) argues that reference to institutions, clearly a 
collective concept, can be permitted in social science explanation, and many methodological 
individualists would argue ⎯  along the lines indicated in the above example of producers under 
competitive conditions ⎯ that reference to collective concepts is permissible, and sometimes 
necessary as a sort of explanatory short-hand.11 In the context of strategic management, those who 
                                                 
8 See Udehn (2001) for a recent overview, or O’Neill (1973) for a compilation of key readings. 
9 For a survey and discussion for management scholars, see Abell, Felin and Foss (2005). 
10  Clearly, this program will often not be completely practicable for empirical reasons: It is usually impossible 
to obtain the necessary empirical information that is necessary to perform such a fine-grained explanation.  
This problem is sometimes referred to as “Cournot’s Problem” (e.g., Davis 2003).  Of course, Cournot’s 
problem does not invalidate the possibility of building an individualistic model that explains the relevant 
phenomenon. 
11 Of course, real world actors themselves also make use of collectives in this manner, for example, when 
arguing that “France won the international soccer cup,” or “Russia invaded Afghanistan in 1979” etc.  
Moreover, real world actors are influenced by collective entities, such as the aggregate price level (Levy 1984) 
because such entities usefully aggregate information (Lucas 1972).  
 9
otherwise subscribe to methodological individualism may allow for occasional mention of the 
collective concept of capabilities as a handy explanatory shorthand. However, all methodological 
individualists insist that ultimately collective phenomena must be reduced to and explained in terms 
of individuals, that is, individual endowments, intentions, desires, expectations, and goals (cf. Hayek, 
1952; Elster, 1989). Thus, the methodological individualist strategy scholar will not accept as 
satisfactory the use of the notion of capabilities until the individual level foundations of this concept 
have been clarified and he will use the term with reluctance.12  
In contrast, methodological collectivism starts assuming that collectives are fundamentally 
independent from individuals and can therefore be taken as “primitives” in social science 
explanation. That is, collectives such as organizations, and “social facts” such as institutions, culture 
and capabilities serve as the primary independent variables determining individual and collective 
behaviour and outcomes (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 8). The broad argument is that structure 
and institutions are prior to individuals in influencing (and even determining) choice sets and 
behaviour. In general, individual-level explanation is rejected in favour of collective explanation. As 
Felin and Hesterly (2005) notes such an argument is espoused in, for example, the view that 
organizations are “strong situations” (Davis-Blake and Pfeffer 1989).  
In terms of the earlier emphasis on opening up black boxes and uncovering causal mechanisms, it is 
clear that methodological individualists and methodological collectivists differ strongly with respect 
to which boxes need to be opened and which mechanisms deserve emphasis, and perhaps even which 
mechanisms exist. In other words, ontological positions are very likely to accompany methodological 
positions. Thus, a hardcore methodological individualist will deny any top-down causation and insist 
that all that matters is bottom-up causation (i.e., from individuals to collectives). A moderate 
methodological individualist may accept that at least metaphorically (cf. the earlier notion of 
explanatory shorthand) institutions exert influence on individual behaviour, for example, in the sense 
that “they” structure incentives and therefore impact behaviour (Boudon 1998). Hardcore 
collectivists may argue that causal relations that operate wholly on the collective level have real 
existence and are not just explanatory shorthand.13 However, this does not mean that this mode of 
explanation cannot be discerned in the practice of strategic management scholars. In actual fact, it 
can. Thus, in the following, I argue that the strategy field has in fact been dominated by collective 
                                                 
12 Will he accept that capabilities exist? As I see it, the methodological individualist strategic management 
scholar may admit ontological status to capabilities in the sense that acknowledging that capabilities describe 
patterns of specialization and co-specialization of firm members’ knowledge and actions that are specific to a 
given firm.  
13 Although it may be doubted whether this position is actually explicitly defended (it simply can’t be 
defended!) by any serious social scientist or management scholars. However, Felin and Hesterly 2005) and 
Felin and Foss (2005) present some examples of reasoning that comes dangerously close.  
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level explanation for most of its history. However, the RBV is an approach that (along with, e.g., 
transaction cost and property rights perspectives) is at least in principle consistent with a reductionist 
research methodology.   
The Evolution of Strategic Management:  
Levels of Analysis, Micro-foundations and Collectivism 
Scientific Progress in the Strategic Management Field 
Has the strategic management field made scientific progress? Obviously, how that question is 
answered depends on which criteria are applied and even on how these criteria are interpreted. On the 
basis of criteria essentially borrowed from economics, Camerer (1985) concluded that strategic 
management had not made any substantial theoretical progress. In particular, he stressed 
conventionalist criteria such as the “coherence” of the theoretical structure. Mahoney (1993) argued 
that the alleged “coherence” may effectively translate into suppressing (necessary) diversity. On the 
basis of what seems to be an instrumentalist criterion Arend (2003: 283) argued that “If …a science 
is defined by an ability to predict and control the dependent variables of interest then strategy 
research cannot ultimately fare well. Perhaps a new definition is needed to provide a fairer measure 
of progress in strategy research.” While Arend may pass unnecessarily harsh judgment, the argument 
here is that his call for new criteria for assessing scientific progress in the strategic management is 
well taken. One such new criterion is analytical reduction, as has just been suggested. Analytical 
reduction is often performed by moving down a level of analysis.  
Levels of Analysis 
As Hackman (2003: 905) notes, “[r]egardless of the level of analysis at which we begin, we like to 
move to the next level for our explanations.” For the practising social scientist that level, Hackman 
explains by means of examples, typically lies lower down, not up.14 However, it is not the case that 
the strategic management field has exhibited a natural tendency to adopt increasingly reductionist or 
micro-oriented explanations. On the contrary, the field has, taken as a whole demonstrated a 
preference for supra-individual levels of analysis, whether these be the 
capabilities/competencies/core competencies/dynamic capabilities, firm, group, or industry levels.  
Of course, there is nothing surprising in this, given that the key dependent variables in strategic 
management research have typically been located at the firm level. However, to work at levels of 
analysis that are higher than that of the individual does not, of course, rule out the need for 
establishing micro-foundations for such aggregate work (i.e., the analytical convenience or necessity 
                                                 
14 Hackman, however, comes out in favour of a strategy of temporarily “bracketing” the focal level of analysis 
and focusing attention on the level immediately below and immediately above this level to gain increased 
understanding 
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of supra-individual levels of analysis does not make obviate micro-foundations). However, the efforts 
to build explicit micro-foundations have been very few. Therefore, there have also been very few 
attempts to seriously reconcile micro and macro-levels,15 in spite of much recent attention being paid 
to “levels issues,” “multiple level analysis” and the like (e.g., Danseareu et al., 1999) in management 
in general.  
There are various reasons why this sort of inquiry has so far been largely absent from strategic 
management. At the most basic level, strategic management is still a young field: No or few fields 
begin in a multi-level mode and in social science micro-foundations do not necessarily come first.16 
Another reason is that in an inherently applied and practical discipline, implicit consensus  may arise 
that issues of micro-foundations and of bridging levels are best left at the level of the base disciplines 
(e.g., psychology, economics, sociology inquiry (Abell, Felin and Foss 2005. A third possible reason 
is that strategic management may be inherently pluralistic (Mahoney 1993; Mahoney and Pandian 
1993) and this precludes building specific micro-foundations (Felin and Foss 2005). Whatever all 
that may be, strategic management has usually been characterized by collective level theorizing (see 
also Felin and Hesterly 2005), as will be discussed next.   
Strategic Management in the Aggregate Mode 
As an analytical enterprise, strategic management began very much in the aggregate mode. Early 
thinking coming out of the Boston Consulting Group stressed firm-level learning curve advantages 
with no attention being paid to the underlying intra-organizational generative processes of individual 
action and interaction that are ultimately responsible for the learning-curve phenomenon. Research 
inspired by the Profit Impact of Market Strategy project begun in the mid-nineteen sixties at General 
Electric and expanded upon by the Management Institute at Harvard from the beginning of the 1970s 
entailed a search for reduced form correlations between profit variables and various potential 
independent variables that defined an aggregative style of theorizing that is still very much present in 
the field. The focus of the PIMS project arguably also helped to pave the way for the field’s perhaps 
first serious analytical breakthrough, namely Porter’s (1980) industry analysis/positioning approach.   
Transferring industrial organization economics to the strategy field, Porter’s approach placed literally 
all of the explanatory burden on the aggregate characteristics of the environment, as captured in the 
famous “5 forces.” The firm as has so often been observed is completely blackboxed in this 
                                                 
15 Usually, the industry and the firm levels are “aligned” through application of the SWOT framework, the SW 
representing the firm level and the OT the industry level. For a forceful critique of the soundness of this, see 
Makadok (2005). 
16 Even economics began in the aggregate mode. Explicit microeconomics only really arrived with the 
marginalist revolution(s) of the 1870s, that is, about a hundred years after Adam Smith’s classic (and two 
hundred years after William Petty).  
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approach. Managers are mentioned, but only as the agents that have to carry out the analysis of 
industries and position the firm in the chosen industries. Their skills at doing this are presumably the 
main source of competitive advantage. Of course, as a practising economist Porter cannot be 
expected to have any particular sympathy for methodological collectivism. And his industry analysis 
does not harbour any ontological pretensions with respect to the existence of industries as anything 
other but producers that recognize that their products are close or relatively close substitutes. Indeed, 
as Porter (1980) himself stresses, the five forces approach used as a strategic tool is first and foremost 
a first cut at organizing information of relevance to the firm. While starting from this cut, more 
sophisticated strategic analysis must deal with strategic groups and mobility barriers, with pricing 
tactics, and the like.   
In fact, later strategic management work that builds from industrial organization economics has 
typically dealt with exactly these kind of more fine-grained issues. As a result, some of the somewhat 
fuzzy collective categories that loom so large in Porter’s early work disappear. Thus, instead of 
anonymous “forces” now come well-specified cooperative and non-cooperative games with 
(respectively) buyers/suppliers/complementors and competitors (Ghemaway 1998; Brandenburger 
and Nalebuff 1996) where the players are clearly identified, and ⎯ at least in the case of non-
cooperative games ⎯ their interaction is explicitly modelled. The case of the Porter approach nicely 
illustrates how an aggregative approach that places all of the informational burden on the analytical 
level immediately above the focal firm sacrifices informational content. Thus, the industry 
analysis/positioning has nothing in itself to say about firm-level competitive advantage.  
Towards Micro – and Back to Collectives and Collectivism 
The RBV has very often been portrayed as an approach that supplied the missing pieces, specifically 
the analysis of (firm-level) competitive advantage,17 by taking an explicit focus on the resources that 
firms control. It is often informally seen as an instance of scientific progress because it treated a 
hitherto untheorized set of mechanisms, that is, the links from resources to competitive advantage 
and in turn to performance. The other side of that coin is that the RBV was reductionist in the sense 
that it literally dug deeper than rival perspectives by placing the primary explanatory burden on the 
resources controlled by a firm rather than on industry structure and competitive interaction. The 
individual resource would, at least on first inspection, seem to lie on a substantially lower level of 
analysis than the industry, the group or the firm. Thus, the RBV would seem to be well suited to 
exploring, for example, how individual employees contribute to value creation and how created value 
is distributed as a result of bargaining processes among the various stakeholders whose cooperation 
                                                 
17 Such a reading stresses (positive) complementarity between the Porter approach and the RBV. That this 
reading may be inconsistent is forcefully argued by Makadok (2005).  
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takes place under the legal shell represented by the firm (Wernerfelt 1989). This potential for micro-
analysis was, however, sidetracked for a long time, until the important recent work of Coff (1999) 
and Lippman and Rumelt (2003a&b).   
It is quite arguable that one of the reasons why the RBV gained so much success is exactly the 
feature of digging deeper. Not only may this has been recognized as an independent achievement (as 
the above suggests that indeed it should), but it also had the advantage of bringing the view in contact 
with organizational theory (in a broad sense, including organizational economics and organizational 
behaviour), human resource management, research on ICT and much other strategically relevant 
research that was hard to link to the more aggregative Porter approach.   
However, as time unfolded, several things happened that implied that strategic management did not 
really fully release the potential for micro-analysis that the advent of the RBV signalled. First, 
standard definitions of a “resource” did not take an explicit micro-perspective. Thus, Barney (1991) 
defined a resource inclusively as “anything that may be thought of as an advantage to a firm.” 
Clearly, this might conceivably encompass organization-level, collective resources, such as 
capabilities, culture and the like. Dierickx and Cool’s (1989) extremely influential analysis was 
widely interpreted as (fallaciously) implying that “stand-alone” resources acquired on strategic factor 
markets could not in general be expected to give rise to competitive advantage simply because they 
were traded. Whatever we may think of the soundness of this conclusion (and for the contrary view, 
see Barney 1986 and recently Denrell, Fang and Winter 2003), the perceived force of its logic 
directed attention to “socially complex,” “collectively held” resources, such as the “core 
competencies” or “capabilities” that were gaining currency in the beginning of the 1990s.18   
There was a move back to the collective level, as strategy scholars increasingly converged on 
organizational capabilities as a key construct (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). Indeed, 
the organizational capabilities approach may now be the predominant way of thinking about 
heterogeneity in strategic management. Sustained competitive advantage, a firm-level phenomenon, 
is now directly explained in terms of capabilities, competencies, etc., that is, in terms of other firm-
level phenomena.  Obviously, this is blatant methodological collectivism (Felin and Foss 2005; Felin 
and Hesterly 2005). 
Concluding Discussion: The Resource-based View  
as an Unfinished Revolution in Strategic Management 
                                                 
18 At the AoM meetings in 2004 at which Felin and Foss (2005) was presented, several members of the 
audience argued that the emphasis in that paper on micro-foundations were not relevant to strategic analysis, 
because all sustainable heterogeneity was located at the collective level. 
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The RBV is an extremely flexible approach. It is so flexible that although originally inspired by 
economics and rather explicitly built in an attempt to establish more secure micro-foundations for 
strategic management (e.g., Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1986), it can also 
encompass collectivist strands in strategic management that are more inspired by the mode of 
explanation found in sociology or social psychology than in economics. The trick to include 
capabilities, dynamic capabilities, culture, collective cognition, etc. among the set of potentially 
strategic resources and analyze them using the standard RBV apparatus (i.e., Barney 1991; Peteraf 
1993) is a rather simple one. Thus, in contemporary strategic management notions of capabilities 
would seem to merge seamlessly with RBV analysis.19
However, as Felin and Foss (2005), Felin and Hesterly (2005) and Abell, Felin and Foss (2005) 
argue, the collectivism that is characteristic of the recent emphasis on capabilities comes at a 
significant cost. Among the many problems they highlight is that the absence of micro-foundations in 
the capabilities approach means that it is difficult to account for the emergence of and change in 
capabilities (except in terms of other capabilities). The problem of value appropriation (Lippman and 
Rumelt 2003b) is also sidestepped, because the bargaining games between individual players that 
result in created value being appropriated disappears out of sight because of the aggregative focus in 
the capabilities approach. And the aggregative focus means that self-selection explanations of firm 
heterogeneity (certain kinds of heterogeneous individuals self-selecting into certain environments) 
are ruled out a priori as an explanation of heterogeneity, as Felin and Hesterly (2005) argues.  
To the extent that the advent of the RBV in the strategic management field represented a 
revolutionary attempt to step down the analytical ladder in terms of at which levels the sources of 
competitive advantage are located, that revolution is now halted; it has in fact given way to the 
capabilities counter-revolution.   
However, there are signs that the pendulum might swing yet again. Thus, in a string of contributions, 
Russell Coff (e.g., Coff 1997, 1999) has argued that attention be paid to internal processes of 
bargaining between key stakeholders in the firm, and has taken important steps towards a 
conceptualization of this. The importance of understanding appropriation lies not just in 
understanding the phenomenon itself, but also in understanding how appropriation feeds back on 
value creation, a key point in organizational economics (e.g., Hart 1995), but one that is presently 
neglected in strategic management. Lippman and Rumelt (2003b) exploit economic bargaining 
theory in order to comprehend this bargaining process. Lippman and Rumelt (2003a) argue that 
taking appropriation seriously has important implications for many of the most dearly held notions in 
                                                 
19 For a contrary view that the RBV and the (dynamic) capabilities perspective are in fact widely different, 
ontologically, theoretically and methodologically, see Stoelhorst (2005).  
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strategic management. Among other things, they point out that there is no entity, called “the firm,” 
that appropriates a residual known as “profit” ⎯ all revenues are paid to factors. Makadok and 
Barney (2001) carefully model firms’ information acquisition strategies in an attempt to understand 
the micro-dynamics of strategic factor markets. Foss and Foss (2005) take an even more micro-
oriented approach and focuses not on resources, but on property rights to attributes of resources (e.g., 
uses and functionalities of individual resources). They show that this gives considerable added 
insight into resource value, in addition to establishing a direct link to transaction cost economics. All 
of these contributions represent evidence that “digging deeper” does result in new insight  
That the RBV is likely to develop by an increasing micro-focus was emphasized explicitly Jay 
Barney (2001) in his rebuttal to Priem and Butler (2001). Thus, Barney (2001: 52-54) singles out a 
number of areas where the RBV is currently deficient, specifically “strategic alternatives,” “rent 
appropriation” and “strategy implementation.” The first area calls for increased understanding on 
entrepreneurship and creativity, an undertaking unavoidable involving the level of the individual.  
The second area, Barney notes, has been advanced by the work of Coff (1999) and others, but there 
are still many un-resolved issues, such as how different stakeholders come to enjoy different 
bargaining positions, why the value of such positions isn’t absorbed in the investments needed to 
create them, etc., issues that would seem to call for making very explicit assumptions about 
individual agents.  Thirdly, strategy implementation raises micro-level issues of the kind treated in 
agency and organizational behaviour theory. Thus, all of the three primarily pressing issues in the 
RBV intimately involve micro-foundations, and if the resource-based research community agrees 
with Barney, future progress in the RBV will come from building micro-foundations in the course of 
examining those strategic issues that require a micro approach.  
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